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The current academic discussion of unconstitutional conditions has
two distinct components. The first is critical; it attacks the proposition ascribed to Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, among others, that
because there is no "right" to government benefits, the government
may condition the grant of those benefits free of constitutional restraint.1 The second is more positive. It offers broad theoretical understandings of the unconstitutional conditions question and attempts to develop a comprehensive framework for resolving
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1. Holmes' most famous articulation of this principle is found in McAuliffe v.
Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 29 N.E. 517 (1892):
This petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no
constitutional right to be a policeman. There are few employments for him in
which the servant does not agree to suspend his constitutional right of free
speech, as well as idleness, by the implied terms of his contract. The servant
cannot complain, as he takes the employment on the terms which are offered
him.
Id. at 220, 29 N.E. at 517-18.
The Holmes' position has been attacked in Epstein, The Supreme Court 1987 Term
Foreword: Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power and the Limits of Consent, 102
HARV. L. REV. 4 (1988); Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative
Rights in a Positive State, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1293, 1304-14, 1380-87 (1984); Rosen-

thal, Conditional FederalSpending and the Constitution,39 STAN. L. REV. 1103, 1120-

23 (1987); Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-PrivilegeDistinctionin Constitutional
Law, 81 HARv. L. REv. 1439 (1968). See also Currie, Positive and Negative Constitutional Rights, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 864 (1986).

unconstitutional conditions issues.2
The commentary has been remarkably effective in its criticism.
The contention that constitutional protection does not apply to government strictures tied to the granting of benefits or other forms of
governmental largesse has been completely discredited. 3 The writers
have shown that constitutional protection does not automatically end
because government regulation is tied to the receipt of a benefit.
Government may exercise as much, if not more, control over individual freedom when it chooses to affirmatively dispense its resources as
it does when it chooses to influence conduct by direct prohibition."
Moreover, as has also been shown, the distinction between benefits
and deprivations holds no value in an activist welfare state because
the boundaries between benefits and deprivations are often not susceptible to clear definition.5
The commentary has been less successful, however, in its attempts
to develop a general theory. Because the government's remedial programs have touched virtually all areas of social and economic life,
the problem of unconstitutional conditions arises in a myriad of contexts and affects the full spectrum of constitutional rights. 6 Any attempt to fashion a comprehensive theory of unconstitutional conditions would be quite far-reaching. It would literally suggest a
unifying theory cutting across all of constitutional law.
It is my conclusion that despite, or perhaps because of, its ambition the search for a comprehensive theory of unconstitutional conditions is ultimately futile. Rather, whether a governmentally imposed
condition upon the receipt of a benefit is unconstitutional depends
upon the definition of the particular constitutional protection involved and not upon the application of an independent theory purportedly universal to all unconstitutional conditions analysis.
2. Epstein, supra note 1, at 15-28; Kreimer, supra note 1, at 1351-95; Rosenthal,
supra note 1, at 1120-24.
3. See McConnell, Unconstitutional Conditions: Unrecognized Implications for
the Establishment Clause, 26 SAN DIEGO. L. REV. 255 (1989) (concluding that virtually
all scholars and judges now reject the Holmes position).
4. Kreimer, supra note 1, at 1324-26, 1333-47; Rosenthal, supra note 1, at 114261; Van Alstyne, supra note 1, at 1449-51.
5. Professor Kreimer, for example, has noted that:
the reach of legitimate government action has extended far into areas previously reserved to the family, market and church, and this extension confounds
easy definition of positive and negative rights . . . [i]f we are to distinguish

sensibly among allocations that results in impacts on the exercise of constitutional rights, the mere invocation of a line between positive and negative rights
will not do the job.
Kreimer, supra note 1, at 1326. See also Rosenthal, supra note 1, at 1142-61; Van Alstyne, supra note I, at 1449-58.
6. Epstein's article, for example, applies unconstitutional conditions analysis to
such diverse areas of constitutional law as federalism, the takings clause, and the first
amendment. See Epstein, supra note 1.
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My skepticism as to the validity of a broad theory of unconstitutional conditions arose when I began to envision the application of
such a theory to the jurisprudence surrounding the religion clauses of
the first amendment. The religion clauses seemed particularly wellsuited to this task since they comprise the one constitutional law
area which is concerned not only with measuring unconstitutional
deprivations but also with measuring unconstitutional benefits. The
establishment clause, of course, has been generally construed as providing constitutional limits on aid7 while the free exercise clause concerns constitutional limits on deprivation." As such, the clauses
seemed to be a particularly fruitful point for investigating whether
an unconstitutional conditions analysis might accurately uncover the
holy grail of baselines from which constitutional violations are to be
measured.
I first turned to the establishment clause. Initially, the possibility
that an unconstitutional conditions theory might help elucidate this
legendarily vague area seemed promising. If the government's refusal to grant a benefit to religious organizations that it provides to
nonreligious groups is construed as a penalty, it would suggest that
the granting of that benefit to religious organizations could not be
considered aid." The grant should not raise the specter of advancement or sponsorship of religion - the paradigmatic establishment
concern. 10 Instead, the grant to the religious organization would be
seen simply as neutral or perhaps even as constitutionally required."
The problem, however, is that while this aid/penalty discovery
may help us in certain cases, it certainly is not the end-all on the
meaning of establishment. As I shall discuss subsequently, 2 it posits
that whether a government benefit program works as a penalty or
7. See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). Strictly speaking the
Court's establishment test also applies to government actions that "inhibit" as well as
those which address religion. However, the Court has yet to utilize the establishment
clause to strike down any legislative provision that purposefully inhibits religion and the
use of the inhibits language in the test is "something of a loose end." See Marshall &
Blomgren, Regulating Religious Organizations Under the Establishment Clause, 47
OHIO ST. L. J. 293, 294 (1986).
8. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
9. McConnell, supra note 3, at 266.
10. See, e.g., Marshall, "We Know It When We See It" The Supreme Court and
Establishment, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 495 (1986).
11. See Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1979). See also Widmar v.
Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 274 (1981). See generally Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs.
for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986) (state vocational aid to blind student at Christian
college did not advance religion).
12. See infra notes 22-25 and accompanying text.

aid to a religious organization should be judged in light of the availability of the benefit program to nonreligious entities, a highly controversial assumption. Moreover, for establishment clause purposes,
it appears that the form of the benefit to religious organizations may
be just as significant, if not more significant, than the question of
whether a particular grant to a religious organization is "aid" vis-avis benefits provided to nonreligious entities.
For example, in Larkin v. Grendel's Den,13 the Court found the
form of the aid to the religious organization rather than the extent of
the aid to be the constitutionally dispositive factor. At issue in Grendel's Den was a Massachusetts provision which granted to churches
and schools the right to prevent the liquor licensing of an establishment located within 500 feet of the organization's premises. Although conceding that a flat ban on liquor licensing near churches
might be constitutional,' the Court struck down the statute on the
grounds that it purportedly vested in the church an ostensible zoning
veto which, according to the Court, "enmeshe[d] churches in the
process of government."' 5 The issue of whether the benefit was affirmative "aid" or not was largely irrelevant to the Court's analysis.
The parochial school aid cases also demonstrate that the establishment issue is often less a question of the amount of aid than it is a
question of the form of support and the symbolic message of the
union of church and state (or lack thereof) that the form of aid purportedly sends. The significance of the form of aid and the irrelevance of the degree of aid was recognized implicitly by the Court in
a number of cases including Wolman v. Walter 6 and Meek v. Pittenger,"1 in which the constitutionality of a parochial school aid program was held to depend entirely upon the location where the state
aid was provided. If the aid was provided off the parochial school's
premises it was valid; if provided on the school grounds it was unconstitutional.18 More recently, the Court has explicitly recognized the
13. 459 U.S. 116 (1983).
14. Id. at 123-24.
15. Id. at 127.
16. 433 U.S. 229 (1977).
17. 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
18. The Meek Court concluded that a state may not provide counseling services to
parochial school children on parochial school grounds. See id. at 367-72. The Wolman
court maintained that a state could provide the same services to parochial students in a
mobile home across the street from the school. Counseling provided at this apparently
neutral site would retain its secularity, whereas counseling within the parochial school
would be imbued with religious overtones. Wolman, 433 U.S. at 247.
Similarly, in Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948), a
program permitting public school students to be released from school classes to attend
religious classes held within the public school building was struck down. However, in
Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952), the Court upheld a similar release time program when the religious classes were held in separate buildings owned or operated by the
religious institution.
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significance of the form of aid over its substance. In Grand Rapids
District v. Ball,"9 the Court invalidated a program in which the
state provided classes (on secular subjects) to parochial students during the school day in rooms leased from the parochial schools. The
Court found the program created an "impermissible effect under the
Establishment Clause"; specifically "the symbolic union of government and religion in one sectarian enterprise. ' 20 Again, the question
of whether the program constituted affirmative aid to religion was
not the critical component in the constitutional analysis.
Perhaps the parochial school aid cases may be distinguished on the
grounds that the question of whether the state in those cases provided special benefits to religion or simply equalized the benefits
available to parochial students with those available to other students
was not clear." Nevertheless, I would suggest that even when an
unconstitutional conditions analysis would lead indisputably to the
conclusion that a failure to provide a grant was a penalty, the concern with the form of the aid might lead to a finding that in appropriate cases the establishment clause had been violated.
Assume a government arts agency provides a building grant as an
award to the organization that submits the most creative architectural design. One would suppose that if the agency refused to give
the award to an otherwise meritorious applicant because that applicant was a Democrat, the agency action would be found unconstitu-

tional as a penalty imposed upon the applicant's political affiliation. 2
Assume, however, that a neutral application of the creative standard
would result in the decision that the award should be given to a
church to finance the construction of a new chapel. In such a case,
even though the failure to award the grant to the church may be
construed as a penalty in the unconstitutional conditions sense, establishment principles would still prevent the granting of the award.
A money grant to a church to use in a decidedly religious enterprise
is the archetypical establishment violation.23
19. 473 U.S. 373 (1985).
20. Id. at 392.
21. The Court, in Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983), for example, apparently
found it significant that the program at issue in that case benefited all school children
including those attending public schools. Parochial aid programs, generally, although
they may be an attempt to equalize benefits available to parochial students with those
available to public school children, are usually addressed only to nonpublic school benefactors/beneficiaries. They may be thought therefore to single out parochial schools for
beneficial treatment.
22. Kreimer, supra note 1, at 1338.
23. See Grand Rapids School Dist., 473 U.S. at 385; see also Witters v. Washing-

247

Of course, at this point one objection is that any arts award example is not well taken since it assumes that awards to secular organizations should be treated similarly to awards to religious organizations. The failure to give the award to the church is a penalty only if
one assumes that churches and other religious entities are to be
treated similarly to nonreligious organizations. Thus it might be argued that the establishment clause requires different treatment for
religious entities and, therefore, it is not a disruption of unconstitutional conditions analysis to suggest that the church be denied the
design award.
This criticism, however, is exactly the point. The establishment
clause indicates that there are different considerations governing
government aid to religious organizations that do not exist with respect to government aid to nonreligious organizations.24 A theory of
unconstitutional conditions cannot unify a problem which is essentially in disunity.
A second objection may be leveled from an opposite perspective.
Essentially this argument posits that if the failure to provide the
award is a penalty under an unconstitutional conditions analysis, it
must be permissible under the establishment clause. Accordingly,
there would be something wrong with the establishment clause test if
it is construed to prohibit the award. How could the establishment
clause require an organization to suffer a penalty?
The problem with this line of attack, however, is that its use of
unconstitutional conditions analysis inherently assumes its own
meaning of establishment. It is, in essence, a circular argument. To
illustrate, let us return to the arts agency example, where we have
concluded that failure to give the award to the church constitutes a
penalty. That conclusion, however, depends upon the premise that

the government may not distinguish between religious and nonreligious beneficiaries. This premise, in turn, depends upon a fundamental understanding of establishment and it is an understanding, moreover, that is at the least controversial. Government can and
sometimes must treat religion differently. The state cannot elect to
begin its school day with the reading of a twenty-one word Regent's
Prayer 25 although it may start the day with twenty-one word, nonreligious passages from Keats, Shakespeare, or Adam Smith.
This is not to deny that powerful arguments exist which advocate
that the disunity between religion and nonreligion should not extend
ton Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 373 (1986); Committee for Pub. Educ. &
Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973). But see Committee for Pub. Educ. &
Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646 (1980).
24. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. i, 92-93 (1978); Kameshine, The First Amendment's Implied Political Establishment Clause, 67 CALIF. L. REv. 1104 (1979).
25. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1961).
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to arts agency grants or similar programs, and that with respect to
those programs religious and nonreligious organizations should be
treated equally. But those arguments must distinguish the contexts
where religion and nonreligion are appropriately treated differently
and, more importantly, those arguments are ones that must be constructed and debated in establishment terms. They cannot be shortcircuited by any appeal to the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions. The application of an unconstitutional conditions understanding becomes useful only if we accept that the establishment clause
demands equality in the treatment of grant beneficiaries. Moreover,
even in this circumstance, unconstitutional conditions analysis is
merely a secondary analytical tool aiding the interpretation of the
substantive right. It is not the focus of the interpretation.
A similar conclusion also arises in the application of unconstitutional conditions analysis to the free exercise clause. The Supreme
Court, in its free exercise jurisprudence, has been remarkably miserly in finding constitutional violations. In fact, despite a number of
factually sympathetic cases,2" the Court has found free exercise violations only in two areas. The first of these - freedom from compulsory education (sometimes subtitled the special place of the Amish
in constitutional law) 27 - is not particularly significant here. The
second, however, which involves the right not to be excluded from
the receipt of unemployment compensation benefits, is the paradigmatic unconstitutional conditions case. Sherbert v. Verner,28 the first
of what are now four free exercise unemployment compensation
cases, 9 is one of the classic examples of unconstitutional conditions
cases. In Sherbert, the Court held that the disqualification from unemployment compensation eligibility of a person who was unavailable for work because of religious conviction was a penalty on the
claimant's right of free exercise.30 Sherbert thus stands for the proposition that a condition tied to a benefit can, in certain circum26. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988)
(forest traditionally used for Indian religious exercise not protected from harvesting or
road construction); Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 563 (1986) (military regulation
prohibiting wearing of religious headgear while on duty not a violation of the first
amendment); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982) (upholding Congress's failure to

exempt employers of Amish faith from payment of Social Security tax).
27. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).

28. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
29. In addition to Sherbert the other cases are: Frazee v. Illinois Dep't of Employment Sec., 109 S. Ct. 1514 (1989); Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480
U.S. 136 (1987); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
30. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406.

stances, amount to a free exercise violation.
The Sherbert conclusion that the grant of benefits is not immune
from constitutional scrutiny, however, appears to stand at the limit
of the utility of unconstitutional conditions analysis in free exercise
interpretation. Unconstitutional conditions theory does not tell us,
for example, why free exercise challenges so infrequently prevail nor
does it inform us as to the basic definition of the free exercise protection itself.
As with establishment, the nature of free exercise must be separately identified in order to determine whether a government action

amounts to a constitutional violation. It may be that an unconstitutional conditions analysis may help us understand that a denial of a
benefit should be construed as a deprivation, but that matter alone
does not end the inquiry. According to the Court in the recent Lyng
case, 31 for example, an absolute deprivation of free exercise rights, if
incidentally imposed by the government, may not be as constitutionally suspect as a coercive deprivation which rewards or encourages
behavior antagonistic to one's own religious beliefs. 2 What Lyng has
to say about free exercise deprivations is interesting. Lyng's suggestion that the heart of the free exercise protection pertains to government actions that influence rather than those that incidentally inhibit religious exercise is a critically important statement on the
nature of the first amendment right.33 It may even suggest that the
demands of free exercise are such that the Holmes position 34 is completely inverted - government programs which tie conditions to the
receipt of government benefits may be more constitutionally suspect
than are direct government infringements.3 5 On the other hand, the
mere conclusion that someone in some sense has suffered a deprivation is neither interesting nor important. It must be shown that the
deprivation is constitutionally significant. 6 And while Sherbert tells
us that a deprivation may occur even if it is posed in terms of a
grant, it does not tell us when that deprivation is of constitutional
31. Lyng v. Northwest Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 108 S. Ct. 1319 (1988).
32. Id. at 1326. Lyng might be read more narrowly as only holding "[t]he Free
Exercise Clause simply cannot be understood to require the Government to conduct its
own internal affairs in ways that comport with the religious beliefs of particular citizens." Id. at 1325 (quoting Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 699 (1986)).
33. It may even explain the distinction between such cases as Sherbert v. Verner,

374 U.S. 398 (1963), and United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
34. See supra note 1.
35. A possible rationale behind the distinction is that free exercise values may be
seen to be more threatened when the government actively influences religious belief by
setting up a system of rewards and penalties, than it does when it simply makes a particular religious practice illegal or more difficult to exercise.
36. For a recent, thoughtful discussion of burden under the free exercise clause,
see Lupu, Where Rights Begin: The Problem of Burdens on the Free Exercise of Religion, 102 HARV. L. REv. 933 (1989).
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import.
At this point I suppose two additional criticisms could be made of
my critique. First, it could be argued that to the extent that I am
relying on cases in my analysis I am missing the point. If unconstitutional conditions were properly understood, the cases would have
been decided differently. (Indeed, I suppose that the most telling argument could be that anyone's critique which relies on Supreme
Court religious clause cases for anything, other than as an example
of unprincipled jurisprudence, is automatically suspect.) My point,
however, is not to defend the cases. It is that unconstitutional conditions theory cannot explain the various types of constitutional
problems that the religion clauses address. The question of establishment is more complex than the question "is there aid?" The question
of free exercise is more complex than the question "has there been a
deprivation?"
The second counter-criticism could be that perhaps the religion
clauses are not, as initially posited, appropriate candidates for unconstitutional conditions theory. It might be argued that because the
clauses uniquely impose proscriptions on both deprivations and aid, a
strict adherence to a rigid baseline may be inappropriate. As Professor McConnell has argued there must be some room between where
one constitutional proscription ends and the other begins.37 Yet, that
room might notexist if there were a strict allegiance to a demarcation line between aid and penalties.
It may be that the religion clauses are unique, in some respects,
but not, I would submit, in illustrating the invalidity of a broad unifying theory of unconstitutional conditions. Unconstitutional conditions theory, as Professor Epstein has acknowledged, is essentially a
search for baselines. 38 Such a search, of course, is appropriate if by
baseline one simply means the point at which government action is
construed as an intrusion into the realm of constitutionally protected
activity. In that sense, one could say that all constitutional law is a
search for baselines.
The theory of unconstitutional conditions goes awry, however,
when it suggests that baselines can be determined by a set of universal factors. First, lines from which we judge benefits and deprivations vary with respect to the particular constitutional provisions.
Consider two women, both of whom have been refused state-funded
abortions. Assume that one has been denied because the state refuses
37.
38.

McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 Sup. CT. REV. 1, 3.
Epstein, supra note 1, at 1.

to fund all abortions, while the other, a prochoice activist, has been
denied because the state refuses to fund abortions only to those
women who advocate abortion rights. In both cases the deprivation is
the same but the "baseline" of the constitutional liberties involved,
freedom of speech and substantive due process, are vastly different. 9
Speech imposes a "baseline" of content neutrality - substantive due
process apparently does not. Accordingly, a different set of factors
will have to be considered in order to determine the constitutional
issues involved.

Second, any notion of universal baselines is belied by the fact that
baselines may not even remain constant within one constitutional
protection. As Professor Sunstein has pointed out in his article on
Lochner, baselines may vary according to the historical period in
which the constitutional protection is viewed.40 As Sunstein has illustrated, for example, a change in the understanding of economic substantive due process occurred, at least in part, because of the common law view that business regulation was an infringement on the
rights of employers. That is, the nonregulation "baseline" changed
as state regulation became the norm.41 Obviously, then, if baselines
change, it cannot be maintained that they are definable by a set of
constant factors.
Third, the religion clauses are typical in illustrating that a resort
to a universal system of baselines - other than the "baseline" which
is essentially the understanding of the constitutional provision itself
is too simplistic. Unconstitutional conditions theory implicitly
suggests that there are constant points of demarcation from which
constitutional deprivations may be judged. Even Professor Kreimer's
analysis, which includes a recognition of three baselines, appears to
suggest that the point of demarcation may be found by somehow
combining the three baselines into one linear mode.4 2 Yet a number
of "baselines" running through a particular constitutional problem
may exist at any one time and some, unfortunately, may be at cross
purposes.
For example, establishment clause jurisprudence has recognized a
number of points of reference that might be termed baselines from
which constitutional violations are to be judged. These include neutrality, the appearance of sponsorship, the avoidance of direct aid,
and accommodation. Strict adherence to any of these baselines, how39.

Compare Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1987) (striking down a California

provision giving property tax exemptions to war veterans on the condition they sign a

loyalty oath) with Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1979) (state may refuse to fund
medically necessary abortions).
40. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COL. L. REV. 873, 875, 916 (1987).
41. Id. at 876.
42. Kreimer, supra note 1.
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ever, might lead to running afoul of one of the others. 43 This is one
of the reasons why the establishment clause jurisprudence is as convoluted as it is. The establishment phenomenon, quite simply,
is not
4
linear. Neither, I suspect, is most of constitutional law.
To conclude, there is no question we owe a great deal to the com-

mentators in that they have effectively destroyed yet another one of
Holmes' aphorisms. They have not, however, found the unifying
principle of constitutional law for which they have searched. I suppose, in ending, I should say that when I talked to Professor Epstein
about his article before it appeared,45 he said that not developing a
comprehensive theory was not significantly challenging. He may be
right. The conclusion that there is no underlying theory of unconstitutional conditions is the easy one to reach. Facility aside, I also
think it is the correct one.

43. See generally Marshall, supra note 10, at 513.
44. Another constitutional provision which, because of its inconsistent baselines, is
also nonlinear is freedom of speech. On the one hand, within speech jurisprudence there
is a "baseline" of content neutrality. See generally Stone, Content Regulation and the
First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 189 (1983); Karst, Equality as a Central
Principle in the First Amendment, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 20 (1975); Stone & Marshall,
Brown v. Socialist Workers: Inequality as a Command of the First Amendment, 1983
Sup. CT. REV. 583. On the other hand, a baseline also exists which demands that no
speech should be driven from the marketplace. These two baselines may occasionally

work at cross-purposes, as when an organization requires a special content based exemption from an otherwise content neutral regulation in order to be able to survive in the

marketplace of ideas. Id.
Indeed, the speech freedom may present even more complex "baseline" conflicts. Assume a state arts agency conditions a bicentennial grant to an artist based upon the
requirement that the artist depict the Constitution in a favorable light. Further, assume
that the artist's work turns out to be critical of the Constitution and the grant is revoked.
If the artist sues, alleging a violation of freedom of speech, is there only one baseline
involved in this case? If so, what is it? Certainly our grantee has suffered a deprivation
that could amount to a first amendment violation in certain circumstances (if, for example, the artist's grant was revoked because he was not a Democrat or had failed to take a
loyalty oath). But there are a number of "baselines" running through this hypothetical,
including content neutrality, historical acceptance, and wealth redistribution. Concluding
there has been a deprivation on one set of criteria does not tell us whether that deprivation is constitutionally significant with respect to an overall assessment of the speech
freedom. The ultimate constitutional resolution depends only upon a detailed understanding of freedom of speech, not upon a universal theory of unconstitutional conditions.
45. Epstein, supra note 1.

